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1. Policy Instruments
CENTRAL-BANK POLICY
The Bank of Italy, the country's central bank, is formally among the
least independent of those studied in its conduct of monetary policy.
All important policy decisions are made by an Interministerial Com-
mittee, chaired by the Minister of the Treasury and including other
Ministers and the Governor of the Bank of Italy. But the execution of
the Committee's decisions in monetary matters is then left to the Bank.
And, in fact, the Governor of the Bank is reputed to have a major im-
pact on the direction of policy, in part since, as will be noted shortly,
monetary policy in Italy is conducted essentially by day-to-day deci-
sions, made primarily by the Bank.
The Bank of Italy makes very little use of the three "classical" in-
struments of monetary policy—the discount rate, minimum-reserve re-
quirements, and open-market operations. The discount rate was re-
duced a few times during the period from the end of World War II to
1950. From early 1950 to 1966, however, the rate was changed only
once: in June 1958 it was lowered from 4 to 3.5 per cent. Minimum-
reserve ratios were introduced in 1947 at the level of 25 per cent; since
then, the rate has been changed only once—in early 1962, it was low-
ered to 22.5 per cent. The Bank of Italy rarely conducts open-market
operations in the usual sense. As will be noted shortly, however, a few
other instruments used by the Bank and the Treasury are similar to
open-market operations, but these, too, are used only sporadically. The
Bank of Italy thus relies mostly on instruments such as those described
below, which most other central banks would consider subsidiary.
Bank Lending to Commercial Banks. As has just been noted, the
Bank of Italy did not try to use the discount rate—which remained142DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
practically stable throughout—to affect the amount of lending to com-
mercial banks. But the Bank is not committed to rediscount bills for
the commercial banks or to make advances to them. This is left to the
Bank's discretion, and it has varied the amount of lending to commer-
cial banks according to its over-all view of monetary policy.
The amount of rediscounting done by the Bank of Italy (excluding
"storage" or "crop" bills, which will be mentioned later)is usually
quite small; advances against securities are larger, but stifi not very
substantial. Total lending by the Bank to commercial banks is thus
small, but variations have on occasion been large in relation to the total
and may have played at least some role.
Control of Commercial-Bank Lending. The Bank of Italy's approval
is required for any single loan exceeding a given proportion of a com-
mercial bank's capital. The Bank thus maintains a certain measure of
direct control over the amount of lending by commercial banks to their
customers. This apparently affects mainly the smaller banks whose
limited capital often makes them subject to the fidi eccedenti provision.
It is chiefly the larger institutions, on the other hand, that are subject to
the "moral suasion" exercised by the Governor of the Bank of Italy on
the commercial banks, and the two approaches thus tend to comple-
ment each other. The Bank of Italy is reported to use these means on
occasion to influence the development of commercial-bank lending,
though in neither case can one measure the impact.
Foreign-Exchange Transactions. Since the late 1950's (and probably,
to a small extent, even earlier), the Bank of Italy has used foreign-
exchange transactions with the commercial banks as an instrument of
monetary policy. In their effect on the banking system's liquidity, these
transactions are the equivalent of open-market operations, the differ-
ence being only that the transaction is in foreign exchange rather than
government securities or other domestic paper. As a means of restrict-
ing monetary expansion, the Bank of Italy offers commercial banks
favorable terms for the purchase of foreign-exchange spot from the
Bank against its commitment to a forward purchase from the com-
mercial bank. The latter can then use the foreign exchange so acquired
for lending in the local market or in foreign markets, for increasing
its foreign-exchange holdings, or for reducing the amount of its short-
term borrowings abroad. Its domestic liquid resources will decline by
the amount of foreign exchange purchased—which is, in turn, equal
to the improvement in its net foreign-exchange position. This may beITALY 143
reinforced by a direct restriction of the amount of commercial-bank
borrowing from abroad.
BUDGETARY POLICY AND THE TREASURY'S
FINANCIAL ACTIVITY
Besides having a larger influence, at least formally, on the central
bank's conduct of monetary policy than in most other countries, the
Treasury in Italy also exerts an extensive monetary impact by its own
financial transactions.
The cash budget in Italy has shown a deficit almost without inter-
ruption during the period. This deficit is financed primarily by sales
of government securities to all other domestic sectors—the public, com-
mercial banks, and the Bank of Italy—and by postal savings.
Commercial banks buy two types of Treasury paper, the short-term
Treasury bill and longer-term government securities. Treasury bills are
held by commercial banks as part of their reserves, since the minimum
reserve regulations specify either Treasury bills or deposits at the Bank
of Italy as reserves; a generally smaller, amount is held as "free" Treasury
bills, those beyond the amount calculated as part of their reserves.
Commercial banks, along with the public, also buy longer-term gov-
ernment securities, which the Treasury puts on the market mostly at
the beginning of the year, when banks are as a rule particularly liquid.
The placement of these securities may be regarded as having, in part,
the function of an open-market operation designed to eliminate excess
liquidity, since in determining the amount to be sold, the Treasury is
said to have weighed, on occasion, the liquidity position of the com-
mercial banks against what the Treasury (and the Bank of Italy, which
technically works as the Treasury's agent) would like it to be.
The Treasury borrows a significant amount from the Bank of Italy,
and its outstanding total has been growing over the long run. It consists
of several items: One is current advances, which may reach a legal
maximum of 15 per cent of the budget's current expenditures. Another
is the "extraordinary" advances that were created during the war and
the early postwar years. The outstanding amount did not change
throughout the 1950's, but from 1960 on, the government has been
repaying these advances gradually. A third is advances in foreign ex-
change, which, technically, are received from the Foreign Exchange
Office, but essentially are a form of net borrowing from the Bank of
Italy.144DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The BankofItaly also rediscounts "crop bills." These are issued
by governmental storage agencies, which supposedly buy the crops,
mainly wheat, at harvest time for storage. This is a form of govern-
ment subsidy, since very often the eventual sale price is below what
the storage agencies pay for the crop. While the crop bills are issued
to commercial banks, which technically finance the transaction, the
bills are eligible for automatic rediscounting at the Bank of Italy and
as a rule are rediscounted promptly. In effect the crop bills are a
means of governmental borrowing from the Bank of Italy, in which
commercial banks play only an intermediary role.
Finally, the Bank of Italy buys Treasury bills as a counterpart to
the deposits which commercial banks hold at the Bank as part of their
legal reserves, although the two are not exactly equal—the amount of
Treasury bills is normally smaller than the amount of commercial-bank
deposits. The Bank of Italy may also hold Treasury bills in larger
amounts and without any relationship to reserve requirements; there
are no legal restrictions on the amount of Treasury bills which it may
buy
Variations in the amount of Treasury bills held by the Bank of Italy
may represent merely a substitution of no real significance for monetary
aggregates. Commercial banks, it should be recalled, may hold their re-
serves either as deposits at the Bank of Italy or in the form of Treasury
bills. If they decide to switch from deposits to Treasury bills, this will
induce the Bank of Italy to reduce the amount of Treasury bills which
it holds as a counterpart to commercial bank deposits (which have
now declined). But the reduction does not represent, in this case, any
change either in governmental borrowing or in the size of commercial-
bank liquidity. It merely indicates a transfer of the holding of Treasury
bills from the central bank to commercial banks, and its impact is
restricted to its effect on their profits. Such a process indeed took place
in 1959and1960, when all the Treasury bills held by the Bank of
Italy as counterpart for commercial-bank reserves disappeared.
2. Statistical Analysis
Chart 7-1 presents the policy variables that appear, from the foregoing
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10
NOTE: Diagonal-line areas represent period of downward imbalances; gray areas repre-
sent stability; white areas represent upward imbalances.
It was usually not difficult to determine subperiods, since movements
of external reserves show a pattern which other evidence does not con-
tradict. For one period, however, I 1962—i 1963, the evidence is mixed;
since this episode is of particular importance, as will be pointed, out later,
the determination of turning points within it merits some discussion.
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point clearly to a continuation of the balance-of-payments surpluses of
1961. In the second quarter, a small deficit occurred, and some analyses
give mid-1962 as the turning point from which to date, the start of
the large deficit which ran through 1963. Later in 1962, however, a
substantial surplus reappeared. For the year from the second quarter
of 1962 to the first quarter of 1963, taken as an aggregate, the follow-
ing phenomena may be noted: Foreign-exchange reserves remained
about stable.2 The balance of payments (on the "official settlements"
definition explained in Chapter 2, Section 6) shows a considerable
over-all surplus of about $500 million. All this surplus, however, may
be explained by a deterioration of the net foreign-exchange position of
commercial banks (that is, by commercial-bank short-term borrowing
abroad), which amounted to some $600 million and which was most
probably not regarded, by the government or by others, as a permanent
feature or a "normal" source of receipts from abroad. It is thus likely
that this was a period of neither a deficit nor a surplus but of approxi-
mate over-all balance.8 In the second quarter of 1963, on the other
hand, a change is .obvious; external reserves are stable, but balance-of-
payments data show a deficit in spite of a further deterioration in the
net foreign-exchange position of commercial banks. This quarter may
therefore be regarded as the beginning of the downward movement
which was intensified during the next three quarters. The imbalance
came to an end in the second quarter of 1964, in which external re-
serves remained about stable, and a slight over-all surplus appeared
in the balance of payments despite a reduction of commercial-bank
borrowing from abroad.
The subperiods are defined in Table 7-1, where the direction of
imbalances is indicated in column 1. Changes in the Bank of Italy's
lending to commercial banks are noted in column 2. As is readily ap-
parent from Chart 7-1, this variable was rather stable and quite small
until the beginning of 1957. During those earlier years, this variable
seems to have been neither responsive to balance-of-payments develop-
ments nor very significant for any other purpose. In later years, the
2Thisis based on data from International Financial Statistics, the source of
foreign-exchange reserve statistics used most often in this study. However, data
from the Bolletino della Banca D'I.talia show a substantial increase, and seem
to be more consistent with balance-of-payments estimates.
When the net foreign-exchange position of commercial banks is added to
official reserves, a substantial decline of the combined magnitude appears during
the year under consideration; this may be judged from Chart 7-1. But, once
more, if the figures on reserves taken from International Financial Statistics are
replaced by those reported in the Bolletino, most of this decline would disappear.ITALY 149
Bank of Italy's lending to commercial banks shows a tendency, al-
though not a very consistent one, to move in a direction opposite to
balance-of-payments developments, that is, in a disadjusting manner.
It also assumed, toward the end of the period, a more substantial size.
An examination of long periods reinforces the impression that its
movements were opposite in direction to those of external reserves.
From mid-1953 onward, two longer-term periods may be distinguished:
until the end of 1959, a very strong rising trend 1n external reserves
was maintained, while from then on the upward trend, although still
present, was only slight. The Bank of Italy's lending to commercial banks
was small and falling slightly during the first of these periods, whereas
in the second it manifested a strong upward trend. It should be noted
that in the subperiod from early 1963 to early 1964—the only episode
of an actual, substantial fall of reserves since 1953—lending to com-
mercial banks kept growing.
Column 3 of Table 7-1 relates to the net foreign-exchange position
of commercial banks. Data for this variable are not available for years
prior to 1959, a period in which the variable was apparently not very
significant. Since then, this variable, too, generally moves in a disad-
justing direction, but not very consistently. The subperiod of downward
imbalance from i 1963 to i 1964 again deserves particular attention. In
the first two quarters of this subperiod, the variable in question con-
tinued an earlier downward movement. This movement, in a direction
opposite to the movement of external reserves, is in line with the
general pattern of the net foreign-exchange position of commercial
banks, and may be explained by the banks' desire to offset, by bor-
rowing abroad, the effect of balance-of-payments developments on their
liquid reserves. In the last two quarters of the subperiod, on the other
hand, the variable rises, although not to the full extent of its decline
in the first two quarters. This is explained by deliberate measures taken
by the Bank of Italy to restrict borrowing abroad and to encourage
the banks to hold foreign exchange. This episode, during the period
of downward imbalance, is the only major occasion when the variable
in question was manipulated in a direction consistent with balance-of-
payments adjustment.
In column 4 movements of the Bank of Italy's net lending to the
government are described.4 Since these are found to be very similar, in
4Inaddition to a series of the government's net indebtedness to the central
bank defined in a way similar to that applied in other cases, two other series
have been constructed. One excludes the Treasury bills held by the Bank of Italy
as counterpart to commercial-bank deposits at the Bank. Going in the opposite150DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
direction of movement, whether or not Treasury bills obtained as a
"counterpart" to commercial-bank deposits are included, only the
former alternative is represented in Chart 7-1. It appears that no gen-
eral, clear association of movements of this variable with balance-of-
payments movements may be established. As may be seen from Chart
7-1, the amount of this lending tended to rise, slightly but consistently,
from 1951 to mid-1958; to fall from then to mid-1962; and to rise
quite strongly from that point to the end of the period. Each of these
three periods included episodes of surpluses, deficits and stability of
the balance of payments, without any apparent effect of these fluctua-
tions on the trend of development of the debt. From the evidence of
column 4, some tendency of the variables in question to move in a
disadjusting direction may be detected; but the evidence is not very
strong.
When Treasury bills held by commercial banks are added to the
government's debt to the Bank of Italy (a series not represented in
Chart 7-1), the trends of developments are found to be slightly differ-
ent; the variable seems now to be stable, rather than to fall, between
1958 and 1962. But the conclusion that movements of this variable
appear to be generally unrelated to balance-of-payments developments,
or probably tend only slightly to move in a disadjusting direction, re-
mains valid.
This is also largely true of the Bank of Italy's total domestic assets,
as may be seen from column 5. This variable is dominated by the
Bank's lending to the government and moves in much the same way.
The inclusion of the Bank's lending to commercial banks—which, as
has been noted, tends to move in a disadjusting direction—matters
little for the movements of the Bank's total assets. The latter reveal,
at best, a slight tendency to move in a direction opposite to movements
of the balance of payments.
The rate of expansion of commercial-bank lending to the public is
given in column 6. There and in Chart 7-1, it may be seen that, while
the rate fluctuated during the period surveyed, these fluctuations can-
not be associated in any consistent way with those of the balance of
direction, a series is also constructed which includes all Treasury bills, whether
held by the Bank of Italy or by the commercial banks. While the fraction which
is held by commercial banks does not, of course, form a part of the government's
indebtedness to the Bank of Italy, it has an effect identical with central-bank
lending in its impact upon commercial-bank reserves. As an indication of the
influence of government finance on commercial-bank reserves, the observation
of this combined magnitude may be helpful.ITALY 151
payments. Only during the downward disturbance from i 1963 to i
1964 did the movement of the rate, which declined considerably, con-
form closely to the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment.
The rate remained very low, however, after this episode, apparently
not as a result of any policy decision but due to a lack of demand for
bank credit.
On the other hand, as may be seen from colunm 7 of Table 7-1 and
from Chart 7-1, money supply did move in an adjusting direction as
required by balance-of-payments developments. The association is not
perfect, but its existence seems certain, and it is consistent over the
period as a whole. Every deterioration of the balance-of-payments posi-
tion is accompanied by a clear tendency of the rate of expansion of
money supply to fall; and with almost every upward turning of the
country's external reserves, an upward movement appears also in the
rate of expansion of money supply.
Finally, none of the budgetary variables—revenues, expenditures,
or the budgetary balance—appear to be associated with the balance
of payments. For the budgetary balance this may be seen from Chart
7-1, and from column 8 of Table 7-1. The budgetary deficit is rather
stable during 195 1—54; it then declines gradually, to the point of
complete disappearance, between 1955 and 1960, and rises again be-
tween 1961 and 1963, the latest year for which data on this variable
are available. None of these trends can be explained by balance-of-pay-
— mentsdevelopments.
The general lack of association between most policy variables and
balance-of-payments tendencies probably cannot be explained by as-
suming that these policy instruments were used to achieve some other
major economic targets—price stability, high employment, or a high
rate of growth. The price level appears not to be increasing throughout
most of the time, at least from 1951 to 1961; this holds true both for
the cost-of-living index, which is shown in Chart 7-1, and even more
so for the index of wholesale prices, which actually declined during
these years. The unemployment ratio appears to be rather high, declin-
ing gradually but only slightly, until mid-1959, and then somewhat
more rapidly until mid-1963. Here, too, none of these developments
seem to have any consistent effect on movements of policy variables.
From mid-1963 to the end of 1965 unemployment was rising—and the
discussion will shortly return to this experience. The index of industrial
production, plotted in Chart 7-1, appears to'have been rising at a fairly
steady and high rate. Significant dips in the rate of increase of produc-152DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
tion may be observed only for the periods from mid-1951 to mid-1952,
from mid-1957 to mid-1958, and from mid-1963 to late 1964. For the
first of these periods information about most policy variables is miss-
ing; the second appears to leave no impact on policy variables; and the
third will now, again, be discussed separately.
The period extending from early 1963 to mid-1964 seems, from the
foregoing review, to be an episode of major interest for an examination
of the conduct of policy in Italy. During that episode all trend lines
were broken: the balance of payments turned from surplus to deficit;
prices, stable at most other times, rose considerably; unemployment
changed its course and started climbing; and the rate of expansion of
industrial production, stable and high most of the time, not only de-
clined but even became negative for a brief period. These are, of course,
developments of a contradictory nature, with opposite claims on the
use of policy instruments: the first two targets, balance-of-payments
equilibrium and price stability, would call for restrictive policies; while
the other two—high employment and high growth—would call for
expansionary measures. The timing of these conflicting developments
did not coincide precisely, but at least for part of this period, during
late 1963 and early 1964, the contradiction is clear. It may be inter-
esting to note, therefore, in which directions the different policy vari-
ables moved in response to these conflicting demands.
On the whole, financial policy seems to have been restrictive during
this episode, as would be required for balance-of-payments equilibrium
and price stability. But the pattern is far from clear-cut. As the major
restrictive movement, the drop in the rate of expansion of money sup-
ply may be cited. This would have been the outcome of the fall in ex-
ternal reserves alone, but it was also helped by a very substantial de-
cline of the rate of expansion of credit. The latter, again, would have
resulted merely from the fall in commercial-bank reserves due to the
fall of the country's external reserves; but it was also affected by other
policy variables—and here the evidence is mixed. On the one hand,
the net foreign-exchange position of commercial banks improved sig-
nificantly, most probably due to the Bank of Italy's specific actions;
this is a restrictive measure, which reduces banks' reserves and lending
capacity. On the other hand, lending by the Bank of Italy to commer-
cial banks increased. Similarly, lending by the Bank to the government,
which affects both money supply directly and commercial-bank re-
serves, also expanded. From this evidence, it is not clear at all whether
the Bank of Italy (and the government) tried to reinforce the restric-ITALY 153
tive impact of the balance-of-payments deficit on money and credit
supply, or to neutralize it. It is conceivable that the conflicting demands
of the various targets pulled monetary policy in both directions and led
to inconsistencies. Unfortunately, data for the budgetary variables are
missing for part of this crucial period. From the available evidence, the
budgetary balance appears to have tended during this episode toward
increasing deficits—an expansionary measure. This may be, again,
part of a general inconsistency. But it may also be due to a decision to.
use monetary measures in a restrictive way, to serve the needs of
balance-of-payments and price stability, and, at the same time, to use
budgetary policy in the opposite way, to combat unemployment and the
slack in production. This would also explain the increase in the Bank of
Italy's lending to the government. But the nature and duration of the
evidence would make such an explanation, at best, speculative.
3. Summary and Interpretation
Italy appears to be a country in which monetary policy was Subject, to
a larger extent than in most other countries, to automatic mechanisms.
The reserve ratio for commercial banks and the discount rate were
maintained virtually unchanged throughout the period. Other policy
variables employed by the monetary authorities, though not stable, do
not appear to have been used in accordance with some overriding rules
—either in order to adjust the balance of payments or to serve other
major policy targets. As a result, money supply (that is,its rate of
expansion) was, by and large, allowed to fluctuate in the same direc-
tion as foreign-exchange reserves. The impact of the latter on the
former tended to be neutralized, to some extent, by an offsetting re-
course of commercial banks to borrowing from the central bank when
reserves fell, and by the redemption. of the debt when reserves rose.
But this tendency was much less consistent, and much less important,
than in most other countries. Another partly offsetting factor was the
tendency of commercial banks to increase their short-term borrowing
from abroad as a substitute for the liquidity acquired by external re-
serves, when the latter failed to rise. This was quantitatively more im-
portant than the former factor; but it, too, was not very consistent, and
played a part only from the late 1950's.
From mid-1953 to the end of 1959, the balance of payments was154DEMAND POLICIES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
consistently in surplus, often a very substantial one. Evidently, the
•automatic impact of external reserves on the money supply was not
sufficient to lead to a full adjustment during this period. Had this adjust-
ment been desired, a reinforcing of the automatic mechanism would
have been called for. The lack of a deliberate policy in that direction
would thus indicate that the accumulation of reserves was considered
a desirable feature rather than a disturbance calling for correction.
This impression gains support from the single major episode in
which external reserves declined—namely, the period from early 1963
to early 1964. Although the level of reserves was by that time very high
in relation to earlier years and to other relevant economic magnitudes
(such as the level of imports, or the GNP), deliberate policy measures
were taken this time in an adjusting direction. This was done by a
reduction, directed by the Bank of Italy, of the commercial banks' for-
eign indebtedness and of the rate of increase in their credit to the
public. During at least the greater part of this episode, the restrictive
policy measures were taken in spite of a slack in domestic activity. It
would thus seem that, in a time of deficit, the requirements for balance-
of-payments adjustment were given priority over domestic targets.
Other analyses of the Italian economy indicate that budgetary policy
was considered a major tool in the service of long-term growth, used
to increase the proportion of saving and investment and to affect the
direction of investment. But this policy does not appear, from available
data, to react to short-term fluctuations in the rate of expansion. The
absence of the use of budgetary policy for balance-of-payments adjust-
ment thus does not seem to be due to the appropriation of this policy
instrument for the control of domestic activity. The only episode for
which such an interpretation would seem plausible is that of 1963,
when the budgetary deficit increased, while monetary policy was re-
strictive. This may have been due to the wish to use budgetary policy
to combat the slack in economic activity, while monetary policy was
assigned the role of adjusting the balance-of-payments deficit.
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